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TORTS: FLORIDA'S MEDICAL PEER REVIEW LAW
PROHIBITS DISCOVERY OF PEER REVIEW
COMMITTEE RECORDS*
Feldman v. Glucroft,
522 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1988)
Appellant's complaint alleged that members of a medical peer review committee ("committee") had defamed him during peer review
proceedings.1 When the committee refused to produce records of its
proceedings, appellant sought to compel production. 2 The trial court
found that the committee's records were privileged under Florida's
medical peer review law (the "statute") and refused to compel production.3 Without the committee's records, appellant could not establish
a prima facie case of defamation. Consequently, the trial court granted

*Editos Note: This comment received the Huber Hurst Award for the outstanding Case
Comment, Spring Semester, 1988.
1. 522 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1988). Appellant, a podiatrist, alleged that respondents defamed
him by asserting that he had subjected a child to an experimental surgical procedure. Id.
Appellant further alleged that respondents' revocation of his hospital surgical privileges violated
his due process and equal protection rights under the United States and Florida constitutions. Id.
2. Id. A majority of states allow discovery of peer review records and proceedings in actions
by physicians who have been denied hospital staff privileges. Comment, The Missouri Rule:
Hospital Peer Review is Discoverable in Medical Malpractice Cases, 50 Mo. L. REV. 459, 477
(1985).
3. FLA. STAT. § 768.40 (1985) (renumbered at § 766.101); 522 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1988). The
relevant portion of § 768.40 provides:
(2) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of action
for damages shall arise against, any member of a duly appointed medical review
committee . . . if the committee member or health care provider acts without
malice or fraud ....
(4) The proceedings and records of committees as described in the preceding
subsections shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any
civil action against a provider of health services arising out of the matters which
are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee ....
FLA. STAT. § 768.40 (1983) (emphasis added).
The 1983 version of the statute was modified by FLA. STAT. § 768.40 (1985). The 1985
version is substantially similar to the 1983 version with regard to the portions relevant to this
comment. In the interest of clarity, subsections (2) and (4) of the 1983 version used by the
instant court will be referred to throughout this comment as the "qualified immunity" and
"discovery" provisions, respectively. The 1985 version has a few changes worth noting, including
a change in the wording, "acts without malice or fraud," to "acts without intentional fraud."
522 So. 2d at 800. A modified version of § 768.40(2) of the 1983 statute appears in the 1985
version as § 768.40(3)(a):
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summary judgment for appellees. 4 The Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed, ruling that the discovery privilege contained in the statute5
operated to abolish defamation actions against committee members. 6
The district court certified two issues to the Florida Supreme Court.
On certification, the Florida Supreme Court vacated the summary

(3)(a) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of
action for damages shall arise against, any member of a duly appointed medical
review committee, or any health care provider furnishing any information, including
information concerning the prescribing of substances listed in § 893.03(2), to such
committee, or any person, including any person acting as a witness, incident reporter to, or investigator for, a medical review committee, for any act or proceeding
undertaken or performed within the scope of the functions of any such committee
if the committee member or health care provider acts without intentionalfraud.
FLA. STAT. § 768.40(3)(a) (1985) (emphasis added).
Additionally, § 768.40(4) was modified and appears in the 1985 version as the following §
768.40(5):
(5) The investigations, proceedings, and records of a committee as described
in the preceding subsections shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into
evidence in any civil action against a provider of professional health services arising
out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by such committee, and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of such committee shall
be permitted or required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence or
other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of such committee or
as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions of such
committee or any members thereof. However, information, documents, or records
otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as immune from
discovery or use in any such civil action merely because they were presented during
proceedings of such committee, nor should any person who testifies before such
committee or who is a member of such committee be prevented from testifying as
to matters within his knowledge, but the said witness cannot be asked about his
testimony before such a committee or opinions formed by him as a result of said
committee hearings.
FLA. STAT.

§ 768.40(5) (1985).

4. 522 So. 2d at 798.
5. Id. The district court stated that the language of the medical peer review statute, read
in the light of Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984), created an absolute privilege which
abolished all defamation actions against medical peer review members. 522 So. 2d at 798.
6. 522 So. 2d at 798. The district court certified the issue to the Florida Supreme Court
as one of great public importance pursuant to art. V, § 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. The
questions certified were:
1. Does § 786.40(4) totally abolish a defamation claim arising in proceedings before
medical review committees?
2. If so, is § 768.40(4) invalid as in conflict with article 1, section 21, Florida
Constitution?
522 So. 2d at 798. Article 1, § 21, gives litigants the right of access to the courts: "[t]he courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial or delay." FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21.
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judgment, remanded the action to allow appellant to file an amended
complaint, and HELD, the statute does not abolish defamation claims
since litigants may proceed with such actions if they can establish
7
malice or fraud without the committee records.
The medical malpractice crisis in Florida began in the early 1970s
when malpractice insurance rates sharply increased, and many insurance carriers pulled out of the state." Although some called it an
illusory crisis, 9 the Florida Medical Association and malpractice insurance carriers mounted intense advertising and lobbying campaigns to
convince the public and the legislature of the need for reform.1° The
legislature responded in 1972 by enacting the first of a continuing
series of medical malpractice statutes designed to curb rising malpractice insurance rates and thereby contain health care costs.,'
To further reduce health care costs, the legislature sought to encourage self-regulation by the medical community through peer review. 12 The legislature recognized that meaningful peer review would
be impossible without confidentiality.13 Consequently, the legislature
included two provisions in the statute to provide for the confidentiality
of committee proceedings.14

7. 522 So. 2d at 798. The court's finding that § 768.40 did not totally abolish defamation
claims rendered the second question moot. Id. See infra note 48 for a discussion of the right-ofcourt-access issue.
8. See Comment, Medical Malpractice in Florida: Prescriptionfor Change, 10 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 593 (1983). Premium rates charged by Employers Fire Insurance Company in 1974
ranged from a low of $438 to a high of $4,974; the Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting
Association rates in 1975 ranged from a low of $2,947 to a high of $29,590. The Florida Medical
Association, Report and Recommendations to the 1983 Legislature, The Judiciary,and Citizens
of Florida (1982). The 1975 higher rates are, of course, low in comparison with current rates.
See Hawkes, The Second Reformation: Florida'sMedical Malpractice Law, 13 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 747 (1985).
9. Some commentators assert the "crisis" was not fueled by excessive malpractice claims
but by the insurance companies' losses in the financial markets. See Cunningham & Lane,
Malpractice- The Illusory Crisis, 54 FLA. B.J. 114, 116 (1980).
10. Id. at 114.
11. See PrescriptionFor Change, supra note 8; see also Hawkes, supra note 8. At least
48 states have enacted some form of remedial medical malpractice legislation. Comment, Illinois'
Medical Malpractice Review Panel Provision: A Constitutional Analysis, 17 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 275, 276 (1986). As of 1985, only Minnesota and West Virginia had not passed medical
malpractice laws. Id. at 276 n.6.
12. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1984). For an overview of peer review regulation
at national and state levels, see Comment, The Missouri Rule: Hospital PeerReview is Discoverable in Medical Malpractice Cases, 50 Mo. L. REV. 459, 462-64 (1985). For a discussion of
the mechanics of the peer review process, see Cuneo, Disclosure v. Confidentiality of Hospital
Peer Review Committee Records, 31 MED. TECH. Q. 172, 173 (1984).
13. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1984).
14. Id.

228
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First, the statute's qualified immunity provision shields medical
review members from claims for damages resulting from their actions
during committee proceedings if those acts are made without malice
or fraud.15 Second, the statute's discovery privilege clause bars discovery of committee proceeding records.16 The interaction of these two
17
provisions has caused inconsistency among Florida courts.
In Holly v. Auld, s the Florida Supreme Court attempted to rectify
the uncertainty caused by the two statute provisions.19 A hospital
credentials committee in Holly denied plaintiff staff privileges based
on negative reports obtained from other doctors. 2 Plaintiff brought a
defamation claim against a member of the credentials committee and
sought discovery of the committee's records.21 The district court found
that the statute's discovery privilege provision applied to medical malpractice actions but not to defamation actions.- The district court
interpreted the statute's qualified immunity provision to allow the
discovery of committee records to determine if the committee members
acted with malice or fraud.- Reversing the district court, a sharply
divided supreme court 24 held that the statute's discovery prohibition
applied to defamation actions as well as malpractice actions.The Holly court determined that the legislature, in enacting the
statute, had balanced the plaintiffs need for discovery against the

15. FLA.

STAT.

§ 768.40(2) (1983).

16. Id. § 768.40(4).
17. E.g., compare Parkway General Hospital, Inc. v. Allinson, 453 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1984) (construing §§ 768.40(2) and (4) as allowing defamation actions against medical
peer review committees if the litigant can obtain extrinsic evidence of malice or fraud) with
Feldman v. Glucroft, 488 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986) (lower court decision of the instant
case and same district court that decided Parkway General Hospital, holding that §§ 768.40(2)
and (4) abolished defamation actions against medical peer review members).
18. 450 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1984).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 218.
21. Id. The plaintiff alleged that he was defamed when the defendants reported negative
information about the plaintiff to the credentials committee. Id.
22. Id. The district court noted that most of the provisions of § 768.40 are ambiguous.
Holly v. Auld, 418 So. 2d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982). In particular, the district court
found the discovery privilege in § 768.40(4) to be "fairly susceptible to different construction."
Id. at 1025. Although the district court held that the discovery privilege in § 768.40(4) applies
only to medical malpractice cases, it certified the discovery issue as one of great public importance. Id. at 1028.
23. 450 So. 2d at 218.
24. Id. at 217 (three justices dissenting).
25. Id. at 221. The supreme court specifically concluded that the discovery privilege in §
768.40(4) is not limited to medical malpractice cases and, in fact, includes defamation actions
arising from evaluation by hospital credentials committees. Id.
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competing need to contain health care costs.- The court decided that
the legislature intended the statute to promote self-regulation and to
contain costs, even at the expense of a plaintiffs need for discovery.
Thus, the Holly court concluded that the statute's discovery provision
was absolute.27 The court reasoned that prohibiting the discovery of
committee records would advance the legislative policy of reducing
health care costs. 28
Justice Shaw disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the
statute. 29 Justice Shaw found that the statute's qualified immunity
provision codified the common law rule that a qualified privilege is
lost when malice or fraud is present. 3° According to Justice Shaw, the
statute revealed "clearly expressed legislative intent" to give plaintiffs
redress from peer review members for damages resulting from malice
or fraud. 31 Justice Shaw asserted that the majority's interpretation
created the "illogical result" of allowing a plaintiff to bring an action
but denying him "any discovery of the evidence essential to his cause
of action. "2 Justice Shaw concluded that the court's holding effectively
33
abolished defamation actions against committee members.
The Third District Court of Appeal in Parkway General Hospital
v. Allinson34 followed the holding in Holly and refused to compel

26. Id. at 220.
27. Id.
28. Id. The court deemed this policy judgment to be within the exclusive province of the
legislature. Id. See Butler, Hospital Peer Review Committees: Privileges of Confidentiality and
Immunity, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 45, 69 (1982) (peer review confidentiality provides the "greatest
benefits to the greatest number at a social cost which the courts are willing to pay").
29. 450 So. 2d 217, 221 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (§ 768.40(4) grants only a qualified
privilege and is, therefore, inapplicable if the parties act with malice or fraud).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Justice Shaw also argued that the majority approach violated a cardinal rule of
statutory interpretation: statutes should be read in pai materia, giving effect to all provisions
if possible. Id. at 222. According to Justice Shaw, "under the majority's literal interpretation
of subsection 768.40(4), we are faced not merely with an ambiguity but with a direct contradiction
between subsections (2) and (4) of section 768.40." Id.
33. Id. at 222 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (this abolition "bars access to the courts for redress
of injury in violation of article I, section 21, Florida Constitution."); see also infra note 48.
34. 453 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984). Plaintiff, a young physician, had been associated
for two years with Dr. Figuero, an older, more established physician. Id. at 124. After a
personality conflict developed between the two doctors, plaintiff left the practice. Id. In his
defamation complaint, plaintiff alleged a series of "vexatious acts, false medication and nursing
reports, and malicious statements by Dr. Figuero . . . which started as soon as he left Dr.
Figuero's practice and culminated in the recommendation by the executive committee of the
medical staff that disciplinary action be taken against [plaintiff]." Id.
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production of a committee's records in a defamation action.-5 The Parkway court expressed consternation over the difficulty of reconciling
the qualified immunity provision with the discovery privilege provision. 36 Citing Justice Shaw's dissent in Holly, the court reasoned that
the qualified immunity provision creates a defamation exception to
the statute which the discovery privilege provision makes "impossible
to prove. 37 The Parkway court acknowledged that its holding seemed
harsh in light of the malice allegations in the case. 3 Nonetheless, the
court adopted the Holly court's interpretation of the legislative intent. 39 While the court held that committee records were not discoverable, it allowed defamation actions against committee members if
litigants could establish malice or fraud without the committee records. 40
In the instant case, a sharply divided Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed Holly and Parkway.1 Like the Parkway court, the instant
court construed the qualified immunity provision and the discovery
prohibition provision to permit litigants to bring defamation actions
against committee members if they can establish malice or fraud without committee records.- Thus, litigants can discover evidence of malice
or fraud only from sources "not immune from discovery."
The instant court recognized that its holding would severely restrict
defamation actions against committee members. 44 Attempting to justify
this restriction, the court referred to the legislative intent analysis in

35. Id. at 126. See Comment, The Medical Staff Privileges Problem in Florida, 12 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 339 (1984).
36. 453 So. 2d at 125.
37. Id.
38. Id. The court stated:
[This] result seems harsh, especially when confronted with the facts of a case such
as this; where the allegations are that the respondent successfully practiced at
petitioner hospital for over two years; that the suspension of staff privileges is a
direct result of his problems with a better established, and economically more
powerful doctor.
Id.
39. Id. at 125, 126. The court stated that the legislature, in order to insure "valid peer
review," created § 768.40(4) to protect peer review participants. Id. The legislature, in providing
this protection, deemed it "necessary to encroach upon certain rights held by others." Id.
40. Id. at 126. "The shield of confidentiality protects only those words spoken within the
four walls of the committee meeting itself and the records made as a direct result thereof.
Anything else is discoverable and may be used as evidence at trial." Id.
41. 522 So. 2d at 798 (three justices dissenting).
42. Id. at 801.
43. Id.
44. Id. The instant court stated that this discovery privilege will inevitably encroach upon
the rights of defamation plaintiffs to discover helpful, or even essential, information. Id.
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the Holly case. 45 The instant court concluded that the need for containing health care costs through effective self-policing by health care
6
providers outweighed a plaintiffs need for redress.4
Justice Shaw's brief dissenting opinion reiterated the reasoning of
his Holly dissent. 47 Justice Shaw argued that despite the majority's
claims to the contrary, the court's holdings in the instant case and in
Holly created an absolute bar to defamation actions based on proceedings before committees. 4 According to Justice Shaw's Holly dissent,
litigants can bring an action for defamatory comments made during
committee proceedings only if discovery of the committee's records
are allowed.49 Justice Shaw proposed to construe the discovery
privilege provision to permit discovery in cases of malice or fraud.Justice Shaw reasoned that this solution gives effect to the legislative
intent to provide committee members only a qualified immunity from
discovery. 51
45. Id.
46. Id. The court justified its conclusion by referring to eight cases in which courts applied
a qualified immunity privilege for defamation actions: MacNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428, 431
(Fla. 1966) (statements of public officials in their official capacity); Robertson v. Industrial Ins.
Co., 75 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1954) (statements made in license revocation proceedings before the
insurance commissioner); Lloyd v. Hines, 474 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985) (statements of
state law enforcement agent as witness in criminal trial); Bell v. Gellert, 469 So. 2d 141 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1985) (statements made in labor grievance complaint which were relevant to that
complaint); Farish v. Wakeman, 385 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980) (compelled testimony before
a legislative committee); Stone v. Rosen, 348 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977) (absolute privilege
of citizen to make complaint against Florida Bar member); Seidel v. Hill, 264 So. 2d 81 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1972) (statements introduced in quasi-judicial proceedings such as workers compensation proceedings); Greene v. Hoiriis, 103 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1958) (statements made
in connection with unemployment compensation proceedings).
47. 522 So. 2d at 802.
48. Id. Since the instant court held that defamation actions against medical peer review
committees were not abolished, it rendered moot the second question certified to it by the Third
District Court of Appeal. Id. at 75. This second question concerned a litigant's constitutional
right of access to the courts under art. I, § 21, of the Florida Constitution. See supra note 6.
Justice Shaw maintained in his Holly dissent that the majority's holding violated plaintiff's
constitutional right of access to the courts. The seminal case on the right of court access is
Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). Comment, Insurance:Does Florida'sNo-Fault Law
Comply with the ConstitutionalRight of Access to the Courts?, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 194, 196
(1982). The Kluger court held unconstitutional a property damage provision in Florida's original
no-fault law because the provision abolished plaintiffs right to court access without providing
a reasonable alternative or showing public necessity. 281 So. 2d at 196. For a recent application
of the Kluger court's reasonable alternative and public necessity tests, see Smith v. Department
of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-89 (Fla. 1987) (holding unconstitutional the 1986 Tort Reform
Act's $450,000 noneconomic damages cap provision since it violated plaintiffs right of access to
the courts).
49. See 450 So. 2d at 223 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 222; see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
51. Id.; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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In an era of spiraling health care costs, cost containment is an
important policy objective.52 The instant case emphasizes the Florida
Supreme Court's preoccupation with carrying out the legislative intent
to reduce health care costs by fostering self-regulation within the
medical community. , However, the court's analysis fails to adequately
address other important legislative policies underlying the statute.m
The Holly, Parkway, and instant courts interpreted the statute
55
to address only the legislative policy of reducing health care costs.
All three cases place the need for cost containment above the plaintiffs'
need to redress defamation claims against committee members.- This
interpretation, however, inadequately expresses the qualified immunity provision which expressly states that medical peer review members
are immune from suit unless they act with malice or fraud.57 Searching
inquiry into legislative intent is not necessary to understand that the
statute's "malice or fraud" exception grants committee members only
qualified immunity from liability.5 According to Justice Shaw, however, the instant court's holding has the practical effect of granting
committee members absolute immunity from liability. 59
A grant of absolute immunity to committee members abolishes
their risk of exposure to defamation actions2o As Justice Shaw asserted, abolishing defamation actions against committee members
gives committee members an "unchecked license to commit acts of
malice or fraud. 61 It is unlikely that a legislature would create such
a broad exemption from liability for acts of malice or fraud.Justice Shaw's interpretation imputes a less radical motive to the
legislature. Under Justice Shaw's interpretation, the statute provides
confidentiality for peer review proceedings unless a committee member
acts with malice or fraud.6 A qualified discovery privilege would per52. See 450 So. 2d at 219-20; 453 So. 2d at 125; 522 So. 2d at 800.
53. 522 So. 2d at 798-99.
54. See 450 So. 2d at 221-23 (Shaw, J., dissenting); supranotes 30-31 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 28, 40, 46 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 28, 40, 46 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Medical Malpractice in Florida: Prescriptionfor Change, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 593, 594 (1983).
57. See supra note 3.
58. 450 So. 2d at 221 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
59. 522 So. 2d at 802 (Shaw, J., dissenting); see also 450 So. 2d at 223 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
60. See 522 So. 2d at 802 (Shaw, J., dissenting); see also 450 So. 2d at 223 (Shaw, J.,
dissenting). See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
61. 450 So. 2d at 222 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 221-22. "'[I]t should never be presumed that the legislature intended to enact
purposeless and therefore useless, legislation' and '[n]o literal interpretation should be given
which leads to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion . . . '"Id. (quoting Sharer v. Hotel
Corp. of America, 144 So. 2d 813, 817 (Fla. 1962)).
63. Id. at 222.
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mit litigants to discover committee proceedings upon allegations of
malice or fraud. 6'
A potential problem with Justice Shaw's solution is that litigants
bringing defamation actions against peer review members may
routinely allege malice or fraud to circumvent the qualified discovery
privilege.- Justice Shaw responded that the remedy for this abuse is
a motion for a protective order.6 A protective order would provide
committee members the protection the Holly, Parkway, and instant
courts sought to provide through their statutory interpretation.67 While
a qualified discovery privilege would continue to permit the prosecution
of legitimate defamation actions, the instant court's statutory interpretation will, on a practical level, preclude all defamation actions against
committee members regardless of the actions' merit.The legislature's policy of containing health care costs deserves
serious judicial consideration. 69 When confronted with the confusing
statute in the instant case, the court looked to the policy of cost
containment to resolve the statute's ambiguity. 7° Consequently, the
court set forth a theoretical compromise between the defamation litigant's right to redress injury and the committee members' need for
confidentiality.71 What seems like a compromise, however, in practice
results in a complete denial of redress for a defamation plaintiff. 72 This
result conflicts with the litigant's statutory right to bring defamation
claims against committee members who act with malice or fraud.73
Ironically, this right to redress injury resulting from malice or fraud
is set forth in the very statute the court interprets as abolishing the
right. 74
Justice Shaw's proposal to provide a qualified discovery privilege
for committee records and proceedings offers a more logical interpretation of the statute.75 By giving effect to both of the statute's competing provisions, Justice Shaw's interpretation offers a true com-

64. Id. This interpretation would provide both redress for defamation plaintiffs when malice
or fraud is present and a qualified discovery privilege for committee proceedings and records. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. See supra notes 48-49, 62 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
70. 522 So. 2d at 800-01 (citing 450 So. 2d at 219-20).
71. See supra notes 28, 46 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
73. 450 So. 2d at 222 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
74. See FLA. STAT. § 768.40(2), (4) (1983).
75. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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promise. 76 A qualified discovery privilege would provide protection for
committee records and also permit prosecution of legitimate defamation actions against committees.7
John F. Germany, Jr.

76.
77.

Id.
See 450 So. 2d at 222 (Shaw, J., dissenting).

